Do takeovers create efficiency gains, and if so, what is the source of these gains? Using plant-level data from U.S. Census Bureau, I analyze these two questions by examining how takeovers affect productivity, investment, labor and plant closure. I find that target plants exhibit net gain in productivity after the takeover relative to comparable plants. The productivity improvement is achieved through substantial restructuring. After the merger, target plants experience significant reduction in investment as well as in wage and employment, especially for non-production workers. Plants with lower productivity are more likely to be closed. These activities also have implications for the merging firms' equity returns. Cutbacks in labor costs and capital expenditure both explain a modest part of merger announcement abnormal return, consistent with hypothesis that takeovers create shareholder wealth through resource reallocation and wealth transfer from employees. Moreover, improvement in productivity is associated with higher announcement return, suggesting that economic efficiency underlies equity market gains from takeovers.
organizations, and issues like that." 4 The restructuring program is intended to save between $2.6 billion and $3 billion by 2012, which accounts for about 80 percent of the total synergy benefits set to achieve by the two firms. Apart from restructuring the surviving plants, the acquirer also reshuffles the acquired assets.
Since the completion of takeovers, the acquired plants face a higher probability of being shut down, especially those plants with lower initial productivity levels.
Finally, this paper takes the current literature a step further by linking takeover announcement abnormal return to target firm's operating primitives. I test the hypothesis whether gains to shareholders at merger announcement reflect expectations of improved future performance or merely wealth redistribution from other stakeholders, in this case, the employees. In doing so, I estimate the effect of pre-and post-takeover gains (losses) in productivity, employee payroll and capital expenditure on target's, acquirer's and the combined firm's announcement returns. Results suggest that cutbacks in capital expenditure and labor costs translate into increased cumulative abnormal returns for the target firm, but not so much for the acquirer nor for the combined firm. The economic significance of these estimates are considerable, too. A 15 percent cut in either total payroll or capital expenditure raises cumulative abnormal return to target firm shareholders by 1 percent. Realized improvement in target firm's productivity is associated with both higher announcement returns for the target and for the combined firm. The results are robust to the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects in addition to deal and target/acquirer characteristics. This finding supports that shareholders wealth creation comes partly from efficiency improvement and partly from wealth transfer from employees.
Efficiency improvement is shared between target and acquiring firm's shareholders whereas employee's wealth mainly accrues to target firm shareholders.
Especially when the above three aspects of evidence taken together, the present study lends strong support to the hypothesis that takeovers represent an effective mechanism to transfer corporate assets to more efficient management teams. This paper contributes to the literature on several fronts. First, it addresses the fundamental question of whether and how mergers create value using detailed information on outputs and inputs. It not only provides evidence on efficiency gains from takeovers, but also sheds light on how such gains are achieved. Previous literature often attributes takeover efficiency gains to a broad notion of synergy or better management without providing substantiating evidence. This study shows that acquirer's active restructuring, evidently through employee layoff and wage cuts, investment cutbacks, and plant closures, contributes to efficiency gains. This line of research is explicitly called for as Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001, pp.104 ) state, We hope that over the next decade merger research will move beyond the basic issue of measuring and assigning gains and losses to tackle the more fundamental question of how mergers actually create or destroy value.
Second, it establishes a direct relation between merger announcement stock market return and firm operating efficiencies and choice of inputs. The results speak to the unresolved question of whether merging firms' shareholder value gains simply reflect value redistribution or improved efficiency gains. While efficiency improvement is socially desirable, shareholder gains from the rent expropriation from workers, and other stakeholders may not be (Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). The potential for such wealth transfers in mergers has gained increased popularity especially among policy maker and the popular press. My findings indicate that while takeovers involve wealth transfers from target firm's employees to their shareholders, they also generate economic benefits by improving productive efficiency.
Furthermore, the current study adds to the recent reviving literature on the role of labor in corporate takeover and restructuring (see, e.g. Pagano and Volpin (2005) , Rauh (2006) , and Atannasov and Kim (2008)). Despite the conspicuous part played by employees in M&As, relatively little attention has been paid to labor in the market for corporate control literature. This paper intends to fill this void.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I lay out the research objectives and develop some testable hypotheses drawing from existing literature. Section 3 describes the data, sample and variables. Section 4 analyzes the effects of takeovers on productive efficiency and other aspects of operation.
In Section 5, I explore the possible determinants of merger announcement equity returns from the perspectives of efficiency gains and related. Section 6 concludes.
Hypothesis Development and Related Literature
The present study attempts to investigate the following three questions:
(1) Are there efficiency gains in takeovers? (2) If there are efficiency gains, which factors help create these gains? (3) Do efficiency gains explain takeover announcement abnormal returns?
In this section, I discuss the literatures related to the above questions and derive some predictions to guide the empirical analysis.
Effect of Takeovers on Efficiency
Traditional corporate finance theories portray takeovers as the market for corporate control which fosters an efficient allocation of resources. The market discipline hypothesis (also referred as inefficient management hypothesis) proposes that managers who pursue objectives other than profit maximization often fall prey to more efficient firms. The acquiring firm can improve efficiency through installation of better management to reduce inefficiencies in the target firm. A related view holds that takeover often create synergies, which can arise from economies of scale, elimination of duplicate efforts, combination of complementary resources and the exploitation of increased market power 5 . If the firm's acquisitions are driven by either market discipline or synergy motive, then after a takeover I would expect the following hypothesis to hold:
H1: The target firm increases productivity after the takeover.
Alternatively, agency theories view mergers and acquisitions as value-destroying investments driven by CEO's personal objectives, either to build a large corporate empire (Jensen (1986) ) or to entrench their reins over the firm (Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ). If the acquisition is undertaken to satisfy the manager's own goal, the opposite to H1 is supposed to hold:
H1a: The target firm does not increase productivity after the takeover.
While both the market discipline and the synergy motive generate the same conclusions about the ex post target firm performance, an in-depth analysis of the ex ante performance can yield distinct predictions to separate the two motives. Implicitly, the market discipline view of takeover assumes that the target firm is under-performing prior to the merger. Therefore, if the acquisition is undertaken to discipline the target firm,
H2:
The target firm exhibits declining productivity prior to the takeover.
In practice, managers often cite synergy as the main reasoning behind M&As. Synergy-based motive for mergers basically imply that two firms together are worth more than two of them being separate. However, existing studies often find it difficult to ascertain about the existence and magnitude of merger synergies 6 . I tentatively develop a hypothesis to detect the presence of a synergy motive. If the takeover is motivated to generate synergy, then before the acquisition, the target firm has to perform reasonably well and possesses some resources valuable to the acquiring firm; After the takeover, both the target and the acquiring firms are expected to reap and share gains. Hence, if synergy is the reason behind the takeover, H2a: The target firm has better-than-average productivity prior to the takeover and both the acquired and the acquiring firm improve subsequent to the takeover.
Prior empirical studies have yet to reach definitive conclusions about performance outcomes preceding and subsequent to a takeover. Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) review a large body of previous studies testing the market discipline hypotheses and conclude that the existing evidences are mixed. They conduct a comprehensive analysis of firms targeted in merger and tender offers from 1926 to 1996 and find little evidence that target firms were performing poorly before acquisition, using either operating or stock returns. This result is against several notable studies using Tobin's Q as a measure of firm performance. For example, Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) find the Q-ratios of target fall from year -5 to year -1 relative to the year of tender offer. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) report that in more than two-thirds of all 5 Traditionally, anti-trust economists regard market power as a separate reason for mergers. I do not list it separately because in my sample, less than 30 percent of the mergers are horizontal mergers in which the acquirer and the target are in the same two-digit SIC industry. 6 See, e.g. Kaplan, Mitchell and Wruck (2000) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) .
mergers since 1973, the acquirer's Q exceeds the target's Q. At the plant level, Lichtenberg (1992) shows that acquired properties generally exhibit low productivity prior to merger, which contradicts McGuckin and Nguyen (1995)'s finding that plants have above average productivity. However, both studies confirm improved productivity performance following the change in ownership. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that ex post productivity changes are associated with buyer and seller's ex ante productivity and firm organization. The gain in productivity of the target firms is lower when the acquired firm's productivity is low and higher when the acquirer is more productive. Their results establish that the market for corporate assets facilitates the redeployment of assets from low ability firms to high ability firms. In contrast, using Federal Two factors might explain why existing studies obtain different conclusions on performance effects of mergers. First, the large sample nature of most empirical studies, which tend to lump transactions with different motivations which lead to different performance outcomes. Furthermore, drawing inference from different benchmarks is another complicating factor because changes between pre-merger and post-merger could be due to economy and/or industry factors, or to a continuation of firm-specific performance trend.
The current study is motivated by the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the efficiency impact of takeovers.
Sources of Efficiency Gains
Many factors such as competition environment, management practices, input quality and R&D intensity can affect productivity at the micro level. 7 Below I primarily focus on some identified in financial economics literature that pertain to ownership changes. Broadly speaking, the acquirer can enhance the target firm's overall efficiency through cutting back inefficient assets and improving upon the remaining assets. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) provide evidence that when managers are insulated from takeovers, they pay higher wages (especially to white-collar workers), slow down both destruction of old plants and creation of new plants, and therefore reduce overall productivity and profitability. Employees make up one of the largest constituencies of a firm and labor costs account for a large fraction of the total costs. If takeover is a disciplinary device, acquiring firm can not only save much cost but also improve productive efficiency by adjusting the wage and employment to an optimal level. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) observe that hostile takeovers are often necessary to force or allow significant curtailment in management practices and activities where target firm managers may be guarding the domain of their control or trying to protect employees from dismissal or wage cuts. Such actions are main avenues to generate values in hostile takeovers and leverage 7 Please refer to Syverson (2009) for an excellent review of determinants of productivity.
buyouts in the 1980s. On the other hand, cost synergy can be achieved through avoiding duplication in administrative functions or transferring efficient management teams from the acquiring firm. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990a, 1990b ) document that changes in ownership are associated with substantial reductions in administrative overhead, measured by the ratio of "central-office" (auxiliary-establishment) employees to plant employees. They conjecture that this is a major source of takeover-related productivity gains. Similarly, Martin and McConnell (1991) find a very high turnover rate for the target's top manager in the years following the takeover. They classify takeovers in which the target's top executive leaves the firm as disciplinary. They then show that disciplinary takeovers are associated with poor performance by the target prior to the tender offer, while nondisciplinary takeovers are not. This evidence supports the argument that takeovers play an important role in controlling corporate managers and aligning their incentives with stockholders' interests.
The free cash flow theory hypothesizes that managers may be unwilling to distribute cash to shareholders, instead, they prefer to invest in negative net present value projects to increase the size of the firm (Jensen (1986) ). Hence, after the takeover, capital expenditure is prone to be cut to correct this inefficiency. Empirical evidence on this hypothesis, however, is mixed. Kaplan (1989) finds supporting evidence in a sample of firms involved in management buyout; but Servaes (1994) Firms retain assets in which they have a comparative advantage in operations, but sell assets peripheral to their operations. Plants retained by acquirers increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. Hence, an acquiring firm can improve overall efficiency through divesting and/or closing down inefficient-run assets.
The above discussions reveal that acquiring firms can create efficiency gains potentially through correcting existing inefficient behaviors (e.g. redundant employment, non-profit-maximizing wages, excess investment) in target firms, through sharing its own management teams, and/or through assets divestitures. I propose the following hypothesis to capture all these strategies:
H3: Takeovers achieve efficiency improvement through restructuring, potentially in labor, investment and/or plant closures.
Determinants of Abnormal Announcement Returns
In an efficient capital market, the gains to shareholders at merger announcement should reflect improved expectations of future cash flow performance and the market expectations are ultimately realized. However, empirical evidence in support of this claim is very limited. The notable exception is a small sample study conducted by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) . For a sample of the 50 largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and 1984, the authors find that merged firms make significant improvements in operating cash flows after the merger, relative to their industry benchmarks. The improvements mostly arises from increases in asset turnovers rather than operating margins. They also find strong positive relation between post-merger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcements. However, the small sample size and the short time period casts doubt on the generalizability of their findings. hostile takeover attempts, finding that layoffs are an important but not a dominant source of hostile takeover gains, accounting perhaps for 11 percent to 26 percent of the premium on average. Rosett (1990) concludes that a wealth transfer from workers to shareholders accounts for 10 percent of the hostile-takeover premium within 18 years after the takeover, and 5 percent for friendly takeovers. Becker (1995) finds that target firm's announcement return is higher if the firm is more unionized, suggesting that union rents constitute a sizeable portion of shareholder gains. In sum, previous studies find some support the wealth redistribution hypothesis, though the portion of wealth gains that can be explained in this respect is moderate.
I test the hypothesis whether shareholder gains reflect real efficiency gains, or mere wealth transfer from labor, or possibly both.
H4: Merger announcement abnormal returns reflect expected efficiency gains.
H4a: Merger announcement abnormal returns reflect wealth transfer, especially from employees in target firms. The comprehensive sample studied here overcomes this deficiency.
10 I restrict the deals to be completed by 2002 because the current Economic Census data is available until 2005 and I want to follow the plants three years after the merger. I require the deals to be completed within 360 days so that I can date the event year in a clean fashion.
11 The acquiring firms achieved a 100 percent ownership control in most cases. 12 This bridge file is matched based on business taxpayer identification numbers (EINs) and business name and address. I am able to match about 70% of the firms in COMPUSTAT. The unmatched cases can be due to different definitions of firms (Census defines firms according to ultimate owners.), change of CUSIPs and name differences. I also hand-matched some of the targeted firms using name and address from SSEL.
Matching Mergers to Census Establishment Data
Plant level information is from ASM and CMF 13 . These data bases include information on total value of shipments, expenditures on intermediate and primary inputs, and other input and output measures needed for the estimation. They also provide detailed information regarding wage and employment which are sparsely covered in COMPUSTAT. Besides, they circumvent the problem with the accounting data as they can be The Census Bureau assigns all the plants owned by their ultimate parent firm with the same FIRMID.
Presumably, after the ownership change, the acquired plants' FIRMIDs would be replaced by the acquiring firm's FIRMID. However, the Census Bureau often fails to update this information timely to reflect the changes. This limitation makes it extremely difficult for me accurately trace when and whether an acquired plant is sold to another firm (with new FIRMID) after the takeovers. Table 2 close 19 percent of acquired plants within three years of the acquisition. However, one cannot be sure of this due to the fact that the ASM only surveys about one-seventh of the whole manufacturing sector. Later, I will examine the real plant closure decision later the in the paper by incorporating information from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) which covers the universe of all establishments in the economy.
Two opposite trends are observed in employment and output levels. While the employment level gradually declines from T−3 to T+3, outputs experience steady increase during the same span, both at the firm and the plant level, which seem to suggest that labor productivity is rising. The sample mean of total factor productivity peaks at T−3, deteriorates in the three-year span until reaching the trough at T, then it enjoys improvement from T+1 to T+2 although the highest post-takeover level T+2 is still slightly lower than T−3.
Control Sample
The first goal of the paper is to estimate the effect of takeovers on target firm performance. Acquirers do not choose target firms at random, which creates a selection bias problem. When comparing the productivity of acquired with non-acquired plants, it is important to carefully select a control group that are closest to the counterfactuals. My basic approach is to choose a group of comparable plants for each target plant based on industry, size and productivity one year prior to the takeover year 16 Once I identify the control plants, I use the LBDNUM to follow them before and after the merger year the same way that I keep track of the actual target plants. The procedure to construct the group of control establishments is specified as below:
• I start with all plants available at ASM/CMF and create three equal groups according to total number of employees (big, middle and small plants) within each three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industry.
• In the year immediately before the takeover, I rank total factor productivity (TFP) with each SICsize category. From the pool of plants that are not acquired the following year, I retain two plants immediately better and two immediately worse than the targeted plant.
• Once I identify all controls plants, I follow the control group the same way I follow targeted plants before and after the merger as if they were targeted.
Several observations guide me to adopt the above procedures to construct the control group. I first match on three-digit SIC industry. Mergers are concentrated in industries undergoing significant restructuring, thus the industry-year distribution of the targets is not random. Plus, it is more meaningful to compare productivity levels within a specific industry. Previous studies on post-merger performance often choose industry median for convenient reasons. However, Harford (2005) discounts the validity of this approach. He assets that due to the changes the industry is undergoing and the endogeneity of the choice to merge, the contemporaneous performance of the industry also is a problematic proxy 17 . I further choose to match by pre-takeover size. A firm/plant chooses the optimal size given its productivity, hence productivity distributions depend on firm/plants of different sizes. In addition to the observable characteristics, I also match an unobserved component -productivity. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Yang (2008) show that productivity changes affect firms' decision to acquired and sell assets. In addition, matching the productivity level immediately before the merger enables me to compare productivity paths for targets relative to controls. This way, I can test hypotheses H1 vs. H1a and H2 vs. H2a in a clean fashion, i.e. how do the target plants reach the efficiency level right before they are acquired and how do they fare after that, relative to controls?
Framework
Before conducting the empirical analysis, I sketch a simple production function to describe the framework and variables used later in the estimations. Assuming a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form:
where Q denotes the output, A is a constant term measuring the efficiency with which the plant utilizes its inputs in production (total factor productivity). Three inputs are used here: L represents labor, K represents capital and M represents material cost.
Let P denote the price of the output, W denote total payroll which is the product of the number of employees and their average wage rate and I denote the capital expenditure, equal to changes in capital stock. The plant's before-tax cash flow from operations can be expressed as follows:
This cash flow variable differs from a typical cash flow number because the plant-level data does not measure firm level costs, such as interest expenses, advertising, and research and development. Thus changes in operating cash flow can be expressed as a function of pre-and post-takeover changes in price ∆P 18 , productivity ∆A, total payroll ∆W , capital expenditure ∆I, and material costs ∆M .
Essentially, I view a firm's operation as a production function which transforms various inputs into a final 17 He argues that any empirical test of performance improvement implicitly tests the joint hypothesis that the empirical benchmark is a good proxy for the unobservable benchmark and that performance improves relative to this benchmark. 18 Unfortunately, neither CMF nor ASM provides information on prices of the output that a plant produces. I extract four-digit SIC industry level output deflator from the NBER-CES database to obtain.
good. Plants differ in terms of an unobserved variable which measures the efficiency of this transformation.
Assuming merger announcement abnormal returns reflect anticipated future cash flow gains or losses as in equation (2), to a certain extent, I can therefore link changes in production primitives to changes in the market value of the firm. Specifically, I use equation (3) to test whether changes in productivity, prices, labor, capital expenditure and material costs explain announcement returns, denoted as ∆S.
where X is a vector of other explanatory variables used in the literature that affects announcement returns, including deal characteristics and target/acquiring firm characteristics with details forthcoming in Section 5.
Variables
Total factor productivity (TFP) is used to measure the plant's overall efficiency. I follow Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) and estimate the following ordinary least squares regression separately for each threedigit standard SIC industry and each year:
where i indexes plants, Output is measured by the total value of shipments, Wagebill is the total salaries and wages 19 , Capital is the value of the capital stock. I compute capital stock by taking the previous Census year's capital stock, adding up reported capital expenditures year by year, and depreciating using the industry-wide investment deflators in the NBER-CES Productivity Database. Material is the cost of materials, parts, energy and electricity. TFP takes the actual amount of output a plant produces with a given amount of inputs and compares it to a predicted amount of output. The predicted output is what the plant is expected to have produced, given the amount of inputs it uses. The residual from the above estimation is used as the TFP measure. Since coefficients on capital, labor, and material inputs can vary by industry and year, this specification allows for different factor intensities in different industries. The residual can be interpreted as the efficiency measure of a plant relative to other plants in that same industry in one year.
Since the TFP measure requires a particular functional form, I also check the robustness of the results by using another two measures regarding performance: Profit margin and return on capital. I divide the raw profit by the value of shipments to construct profit margin and by capital stock to derive return to capital.
The profit is calculated as the value of shipments net of labor and material costs. 
Effects on Efficiency
I first compare the differences between target and controls cross-sectionally in the takeover completion year (T), three years prior to (T−3, T−2 and T−1) and three years subsequent to the takeover (T+1, T+2 and T+3). The specification is the following:
The dependent variable Y it includes TFP, profit margin and return on capital. In the regression, I use industry interacted with year fixed effects to account for industry-year specific shocks and use state fixed effects to account for any potential regional differences. In addition, plant size, measured by logarithm of total number of employees, plant vintage measured by the logarithm of age, and capital intensity, measured by the capital stock divided by total number of employees are also controlled for. β can be interpreted as the average difference in Y between targets and control plants in the same state and industry-year conditional on size, vintage and capital intensity. Target plants' efficiency premium over controls falls by half from T−3 to T−1. The point estimate of β falls from 0.015 at T−3 to 0.007 at T−1; however, there is a small improvement from T−2 to T−1. This evidence lends mild support to the hypothesis that the acquired firm sees declining productivity prior to the acquisitions. This result seems to buttress H2, -the target firm exhibits declining productivity prior to the takeover. H1 and H2 taken together, results are consistent with the notion that takeovers are undertaken to discipline the inefficiently-run target firms.
The pattern observed in profit margin and returns to capital measures bear a close resemblance to that in total factor productivity, although the two also display some differences. Consistent with the TFP graph, the target plants' Profit margins enjoys a positive premium over the controls throughout the entire sample period.
To the contrary, the target plants' Returns on capital are inferior relative to controls before the completion of the takeovers. Compared with Profit margin, point estimates on Return on Capital are substantially greater; because the two variables share the same numerators, the incongruence between the two figures suggests that capital stock experiences a greater fluctuation than total output.
While Figure 1 is intuitive, it is less clear as to whether on average, the target plants are better than their pre-takeover efficiency level. To further compare the productivity differences of target plants relative to controls before and after the takeover, I perform a difference-in-difference analysis for target and control plants in an unbalanced six-year 20 panel:
In the above equation, After is a dummy variable equal to one for T+1, T+2 and T+3 and zero otherwise.
Target is a dummy variable equal to zero for control plants. Plant size and capital intensity are included as controls. Included are only plants for which at least one observation in three years before and after the event is available. The above design is closest in spirit to a program evaluation regression often used by labor economists. Targeted plants are the "treatment" group, the matched plants not to be acquired are the "control" group; the event is "takeover". Essentially, I am evaluating the effect of takeover by comparing the before-and-after changes of the treated with that of the control.
The resulting difference-in-difference estimate is presented in Table 3 . The coefficient on the interaction term between Target and After can be interpreted as the difference in productivity growth between three years before the merger and three years after the merger for targets relative to productivity growth achieved by control plants. As can be seen from the first two columns, β 2 is positive and statistically significant. This indicates plants that are acquired exhibit higher growth in productivity than controls. On average three years after the merger, the acquired plants accomplish a 1.1 percent faster productivity growth premium relative to controls. Columns 3 to 6 use Profit margin and Return on capital to check the robustness of the productivity results. As they turn out, β 2 for both dependent variables are positive, albeit not statistically significant for Profit margin. Similar to the results shown in Figure 1 , Return on capital sees dramatic increase, acquired plants enjoy a 25 percent higher growth rate relative to controls. After controlling plant fixed effect, both plant size and capital intensity are negatively associated with performance. The negative coefficient on After might be due to the fact that any major acquisition leads to a drop in productivity (Schoar (2002) ) or due to negative industry shocks.
20 I drop year T -the merger completion year to have a more balanced data for before-and-after analysis.
Effects on Input and Output
Changes in production inputs, both in terms of quantity and in quality, could affect TFP estimates. I first investigate along these lines. Table 4 reports results from the above difference-in-difference estimations for various inputs used in production. For all four input variables, capital expenditure, material cost, wage and employment, the coefficient on the interaction term is all negative, indicating that the acquired plants experience greater reductions than controls post-takeovers. Capital expenditure experiences the biggest cutbacks decreasing by about 12 percent more than controls. These cutbacks in capital expenditure can potentially improve productive efficiency from two avenues. First, merging firms are able to realize significant economies in their capital expenditures through elimination of duplicate investments or through creation of a more efficient internal capital market. Second, previous investments may be wasted on negative presentvalue projects which destroys firm value. This gives the acquiring firms an opportunity to scale back capital expenditure to restore efficiency. In contrast to capital expenditure, column 2 in Table 4 indicates that material costs remain largely unaffected in comparison to the control group.
Column 3 and 4 examine the wage and employment changes. Wage levels dips by about 0.5 percent and employment drops by about 2 percent more than those of the controls. This finding is in disagreement with hope that firm owners could share productivity gains with their employees 21 . Instead, target firm's employees are disadvantaged are the takeovers. I assume managers face lesser resistance from acquired firm's employees since there is greater understanding that firms have to consolidate operations after a merger.
I further break down the wage and employment outcomes for two groups of worker: production-workers and non-production workers. Note that non-production workers are those who work within a plant 22 . I do not have information regarding the non-production worker who work at the headquarters or other nonmanufacturing establishments such as separate sales or distribution centers. As can be seen from the bottom panel of Table 4 , while wage for two groups experience minimal drop, the reduction in employment is mostly concentrated among non-production workers. On average, non-production workers are cut by about 5 percent more than controls. In sum, the negative impact of takeovers on labor is mostly concentrated on nonproduction worker force. This finding is consistent with the Jensen and Ruback (1983)'s view that market for corporate control is an important component of the managerial labor market. Takeovers create an arena for competition among managerial teams for the rights to manage resources. Efficiency is achieved through replacing acquired firms' management teams.
Plant Closure
The overall efficiency of the target asset can be improved upon mainly through two channels. I use a linear probability model to compare plant closure intensity between targeted and control plants,
controlling for a plant's age, size and initial productivity:
Results in Table 5 indicate that acquired plants face higher exit rates than controls each and every year after the merger. The coefficients on Target denote the difference in exit probability between a target plant and a control plant at each cross-section. At the year when the merger is completed, targeted plants are 0.5 percent more likely to cease operation. This difference jumps to 2.2 percent in the first two years and to 1.6 percent the third year following the takeover. Not surprisingly, smaller plants, younger plants, plants with lower productivity are more likely to be shut down.
To examine whether the acquiring firms are more likely to close low productivity plants, I interact the dummy variable of Target with initial productivity. Except for year T+3, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and statistically significant at 10 percent level. Besides, the main effect on Target remains to be negative and significant. This implies that the acquiring firms are not only more aggressive in shutting down plants, but also shutting down the less efficient ones.
As one can see from results in Section 4. restructuring than a similar control plants. Restructuring is manifested in cutting back investment and labor within a plant, and in shutting down plants in the target firm's portfolios. Therefore, H3 is supported:
The acquiring firms improve the target's overall efficiency both through selecting more efficient plants and through improving the efficiency level of these surviving plants.
Robustness Check with A Different Control Sample
To mitigate the concern that the above results are an artifact of a particular control sample, I alter the way to construct the controls by matching on industry, age and size. Specifically, I create three equal age (young, mid-aged and old) groups within each three-digit SIC industry. In the year immediately before the takeover, I rank total number of employees with each SIC-age cell and I retain two plants immediately bigger and two immediately smaller than the targeted plant to form my control groups. The number of observations of this control group is slightly greater than the previous one because there are more missing values for TFP than for total number of employees.
I repeat the difference-in-difference estimations using this new group of control plants and report the results in Table 6 . Results in Table 6 are generally similar to Table 3 . The TFP growth premium of target plants over this new sample of control plants is about 1 percent, compared with the 1.1 percent in Table 3 ;
Return on capital undergoes substantial improvement by about 16 percent, compared to the point estimate of 25 percent in Table 3 . The only difference is spotted on Profit margin, which experiences a little dip (less than one-tenth of a percent) in growth relative to controls, but this figure is not statistically significant.
Coefficients on other control variables in Table 6 are consistent with those in Table 3 , too. Table 7 reports results from regressions used in Table 4 with this different control sample. Similar to Table   4 , capital expenditure declines by about 10 percent more than the controls, compared with a magnitude of 12 percent in Table 4 ; wage growth drops by less than one percent and employment level by about two percent, both are comparable to the numbers in Table 4 . When I break down wage and employment outcomes into production and non-production worker groups, the only variable that sees significantly more drop relative to controls is non-production worker's employment level, which mimics to what I find in Table 4 .
In summary, the results consistently show that targeted plants experience about 1 percent net productivity gains over controls. Capital expenditure experiences significant drop, by about 10 to 12 percent more than controls. Employees suffer after the takeovers. Average wage and employment drop by about 1 and 2 percent more than controls, respectively. The negative impacts are felt unevenly between production workers and non-production workers. The employment and wage cuts are mostly concentrated among non-production workers whereas production workers are mildly affected.
Acquirer's Incumbent Plants
While the preceding analysis deals with the performance of target plants after a takeover, a related question is how the acquirers' incumbent plant fare affected by the transaction. Theory does not make strong predictions about the productivity of such plants. The increase in the scope of the firm might decrease the productivity of existing plants. On the other hand, the synergy generated from the merger might benefit both the acquired and the incumbent plants. Schoar (2002) I employ the same methodology used to investigate the impact of acquisition on acquiring firm's incumbent plants. I construct a control sample by matching on incumbent plants' pre-acquisition industry, size and total factor productivity and estimate the same difference-in-difference model as in equation (7).
As seen from Table 8 , after the acquisition, acquiring firms' incumbent plants experience net improvement relative to controls. Both total factor productivity and Profit margin improve by about 1 percent more relative to controls. Return on capital also increases, albeit statistically insignificant at the conventional level. This finding partially supports the synergy proposition in H2a -the acquiring firm's incumbent plants also gain some benefits after the acquisitions. subsequent to a takeover. I augment the standard regressions of merging firms' abnormal returns with these before-and-after-change in production primitives in the following equation:
In the above equation,
In equation (9), the dependent variable is the five-day I use Equation (9) to test hypothesis 4 vs. hypothesis 4a. The hypothesis that merger abnormal returns reflect the expected efficiency improvements implies β 1 is positive. Alternatively, if merger abnormal returns reflect wealth redistribution from the target firm's employees, β 2 should be negative. Furthermore, β 3 relates to the hypothesis whether reduced capital expenditure translates to a higher abnormal return. Table 10 reveal that improvement in TFP is strongly associated with higher announcement returns. The economic significance of the coefficients is also meaningful. For instance, in the last column, the coefficient of 0.087 implies that an increase of one standard deviation of ∆T F P would increase the five-day abnormal return of the target firm by about 2.2 percent.
Target's CAR

Acquirer's CAR
I then turn my attention to the acquiring firm's announcement returns. Results are reported in Table   11 . Sample size drops from 931 to 411 because less than half of the acquirers are public-listed and have The general absence of significance for acquirer CAR is perhaps not surprising. There are two plausible explanations for this. First, takeover announcement also reflect new information revealed about acquirers themselves which can dwarf information about the takeovers. Second, on average, these acquiring firms are much bigger than the target, therefore, improvement over the target firm themselves might not lead to discernable gains to the acquiring firms themselves.
Total CAR
The more informative measure of the shareholders gains or losses is the CAR for the target and the acquired combine together. In Table 12 , I examine the determinants of the weighted CAR of the acquired and the target. The weights are based on two firms' market capitalization equity six days prior to the announcement.
Both the acquirer's size and Tobin's Q are negatively related with total CAR. Total CAR is higher if the deal is mostly financed with cash and higher if it is not a conglomerate merger. While all other ∆X variables are not statistically significant associated with total CAR, ∆T F P is the only exception. Coefficients on ∆T F P in column one and four suggest improvement in productivity is associated with a higher total CAR. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient of 0.043 implies that a one standard deviation increase in ∆T F P adds about 1 percent to the total CAR. This impact is very noteworthy considering that the sample mean of the total CAR is about 4 percent.
In sum, when one focuses on target's CAR, the empirical evidence provides support to both H4 and h4a;
when one focuses on the total CAR, only H4 is supported.
Caveats
The unsettling question emerging from the previous analysis is that most of the variables such cutbacks on investment, labor cost savings and improvement in efficiency only have explanatory power for target firm's CAR rather than the acquiring firms' CAR. If takeovers generate efficiency gains and/or save financial resources, ultimately, the acquiring firms' shareholders should benefit. However, this link is missing in the current study. It might be because the target firms' shareholder possess the bargaining power to extract most of the gains. It remains an unresolved question as to why the target shareholders capture the lion's share of the joint merger gains. Explaining the division of gains between target and acquirer shareholders is beyond the scope of this paper.
Prior studies have adopted two approaches to establish a link between merger announcement returns and specific types of economic gains. One approach, first used in Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), is to examine the ex post performance of the merging firms. However, these studies are subject to sample selection bias; also so far, no robust relations have been found between post-merger operating performance and these forecasts (Bernile and Baugess (2010)). In light of this, I have entertained some plausible variables, such as pre-takeover labor cost shares and productivity changes as proxies for post-takeover productivity improvements. To find a convincing measure is a task for future research. control group of plants that are comparable to each target plant in terms of industry, size, and productivity the year preceding the takeover. Using a difference-in-difference approach, I find that takeover are followed by net improvements in total factor productivity, profit margin and return on capital relative to controls. This improvement is accomplished through two avenues. First, the target plants undergo significant restructuring in capital expenditure, wage and employment to generate cost savings. Negative impacts to labor are mostly concentrated among non-production workers. In addition, the acquiring firms are more aggressive in closing the acquired plants, especially those less efficient ones. Furthermore, target plants experience declines prior to the takeovers before substantial improvement, which is consistent with hypothesis that takeovers function as a disciplinary device. On the other hand, the acquiring firms' incumbent plants also experience productivity improvement.
These micro-level transformations have implications for merger announcement equity returns, too, I estimate the effect of the ex post changes in productivity, capital expenditure, total payroll and other costs on the firm's cumulative abnormal return around the takeover announcement. Results suggest investment and labor cost savings are significantly associated positive abnormal return only for the target firm. This evidence seems to suggest that mergers lead to a wealth distribution from employees to stockholders.
Improvement in total factor productivity underlies both higher target firm's and the total return for the target and acquirer's combined. A one standard deviation increase in productivity improvement can increase the abnormal returns to target shareholders by about 2.2 percent and to combined shareholders by about 1 percent. However, none of these factors are significantly associated with the acquirer' abnormal returns.
In the future, I plan to explore the reason why the efficiency gains accrue to target firm shareholder rather than to acquiring firm's shareholders. Also, better variables which can measure market's expected improvement in efficiency can further strengthen the argument. Overall, the results support that takeovers are an efficient mechanism to reallocate productive assets to management that can best utilize them. Table 1 describes the number of merger transactions in the study. Column 2 reports the number of mergers completed year by year that can be matched to ASM/CMF. Column 3 and 4 report the mean and standard deviation of deal value reported in the SDC. Column 5 and 6 report the mean and standard deviation for five-day Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) adjusted for value-weighted market stock return around deal announcements for the target firm. Plant and firm level characteristics at each year around the merger when T is the year when the merger is completed. Output is the total value of shipment, expressed in millions of dollars. TFP, the total factor productivity, is measured as the residual from estimating equation (5) for each three digit SIC industry and year. Results are from estimating a difference-in-difference regression of Y it = α + β 1 After t + β 2 (After t * Target i + Xγ + it . The data is an unbalanced six-period panel (T-3, T-2, T-1, T+1, T+2, and T+3) of target plants and control group. Total factor productivity (TFP) is the residual from estimating a log linear Cobb-Douglas production function for each industry and year at the plant level, where one regresses the value of output on total payroll, capital stock and material cost for each 3-digit SIC and year. Profit margin is defined as the ratio of profit (sales minus material cost and labor cost) to sales. Return to capital is defined as the ratio of profit to capital stock. The dummy variable After is equal to one for a target firm's plant in period T+1, T+2 and T+3 and zero in period T-1, T-2 and T-3. Period T is dropped from the analysis. Target is a dummy variable equal to one if a plant's parent firm is acquired by period T and zero if a plant is in the constructed control group. Capital per worker is the ratio of total capital stock to total number of employees. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The following two tables re-estimate Equation (7) using a different sample of control plants. Instead of matching on targeted plant's industry, size and efficiency, I construct another control sample by matching on industry, age and size. Variables and models are exactly the same as in Table 3 . The following two tables re-estimate Equation (7) using the sample of acquiring firms' incumbent plants. Similar to the approach adopted in Table 3 , I construct the control sample by matching on industry, size and pre-acquisition total factor productivity. Variables and models are exactly the same as in Table 3 . Table 10 : Determinants of Target's CAR
The table reports results from estimating a firm-level OLS regression of equation (9) . CAR[-2,+2] is the five-day cumulative abnormal return for the target firm adjusted for CRSP value-weighted market return. ∆X is a vector of changes between period T-1 and T+1 for the target firm constructed as a employmentweighted average of plant level variables. ∆TFP = TFP T +1 − TFP T −1 ; ∆X = LogX T +1 − LogX T −1 where X includes total payroll, investment, material and price. Price is the 4-digit SIC output price index available from NBER-CES data set. Premium is defined as the ratio of deal value reported in SDC to target firm's outstanding equity value. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target firm and the acquirer firm share the same 2-digit SIC. Cash is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer's payment to target shareholder use more than 50 percent of cash and zero otherwise. Log(Firm assets) is the logarithm of target firm's book assets and Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets for the target firm (from Compustat). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The table reports results from estimating a firm-level OLS regression of equation (9) . CAR[-2,+2] is the five-day cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm adjusted for CRSP value-weighted market return. ∆X is a vector of changes between period T-1 and T+1 for the target firm constructed as a employmentweighted average of plant level variables. ∆TFP = TFP T +1 − TFP T −1 ; ∆X = LogX T +1 − LogX T −1 where X includes total payroll, investment, material and price. Price is the 4-digit SIC output price index available from NBER-CES data set. Premium is defined as the ratio of deal value reported in SDC to target firm's outstanding equity value. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target firm and the acquirer firm share the same 2-digit SIC. Cash is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer's payment to target shareholder use more than 50 percent of cash and zero otherwise. Log(Firm assets) is the logarithm of the acquiring firm's book assets and Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value of assets to replacement value of assets for the acquiring firm (from Compustat). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The table reports results from estimating a firm-level OLS regression of equation (9) . CAR[-2,+2] is equity value weighted average of target' CAR and acquirer' CAR. ∆X is a vector of changes between period T-1 and T+1 for the target firm constructed as a employment-weighted average of plant level variables. ∆TFP = TFP T +1 − TFP T −1 ; ∆X = LogX T +1 − LogX T −1 where X includes total payroll, investment, material and price. Price is the 4-digit SIC output price index available from NBER-CES data set. Premium is defined as the ratio of deal value reported in SDC to target firm's outstanding equity value. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target firm and the acquirer firm share the same 2-digit SIC. Cash is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer's payment to target shareholder use more than 50 percent of cash and zero otherwise. Log(Firm assets) is the logarithm of acquiring firm's book assets and Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value of assets to replacement value of assets for the acquiring firm (from Compustat). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
